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ambulances in emergency cases. Boggs v. Jewel Tea Co., 266 Pa. 428,
S09 A. 666 (1920); Syck v. Duluth St. Ry. Co., 146 Minn. 118, 177
N.W. 944 (1920), dictum.
The conflict in those states where there is no provision for exemp-
tion seems to be based on whether the letter of the statute, rather than
its spirit, is to control. Judge Zimmerman predicated his dissent in the
principal case on the fact that it is hardly reasonable that a legislative
body, in passing a statute or ordinance designed to suppress reckless
driving, intended to restrict officers in the speed they might find neces-
sary to use in arresting a violator of such statute or ordinance. He stated
that a motorcycle policeman would be seriously handicapped in the
performance of his duty to arrest speed violators, if he were held to an
observance of speed and other traffic regulations, and if his violations
thereof were to be denoted as negligence. In Edberg v. Johnson, supra,
the court stated: "It would be an affront to the intelligence of the
legislature to hold that, in enacting a statute designed to stop speeding,
it intended to restrict peace officers to the prescribed speed limits when in
pursuit of violators of the statute." The decision in the principal case,
based on the strict letter of the statute, seems contrary to public conveni-
ence and necessity. But so long as the Ohio Courts adhere to their
present position, the easiest way out of the situation seems to lie in amend-
ing the appropriate statutes and ordinances to provide for the exemption
sought.
HARRY L. BROWN
VIOLATION OF STATUTE AS NEGLIGENCE PER SE - PRoxI-
MATE CAUSE
The wagon of plaintiff's decedent was backed up to a platform of a
cider mill on the north side of the highway in such a manner that the
horses were standing on the highway with their heads and feet at or
near the north curb line. It was at night and decedent's wagon had no
lights. However, the highway was illuminated by lights of the cider
mill. Defendant, proceeding westerly, negligently ran into the lead
horse knocking him on the decedent who received injuries from which
he later died. Held: that it was a question for the jury whether deced-
ent's negligence, if any, was a contributory cause of the injury. Miller
v. Trummer, ddmx., 50 Ohio App. 446, 198 N.E. 492, 2 Ohio Op.
I S, 19 Abs. 130, Ohio Bar (Nov. 25, 1935).
Section 12614-3 of Motor Vehicles Chapter provides, "It shall be
the duty of every person who operates, drives, or has upon any . . .
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highway.. a vehicle on wheels (at night) to have attached thereto a
light or lights, etc ..
In Ohio violation of a statute is negligence per se. Schell v. Dubois,
94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N.E. 664, L.R.A. 1917, 710, 13 N.C.C.A.
982 (1916); Pennsylvania Rd. Co. v. Rusynik, 117 Ohio St. 530, 159
N.E. 826, 56 A.L.R. 588 (1927). Violation of this statute, Sec.
12614-3 of General Code, has been held negligence per se. Lima Used
Car Exchange Co. v. Hemperly, 120 Ohio St. 400, 166 N.E. 364
(1929); Chesrownv. Bevier, IO Ohio St. 282, 128 N.E. 94 (1920);
Darby v. Jarrett, 26 Ohio App. 194, 159 N.E. 858 (1927).
Since it appears from the facts in the principal case that the horses
were standing on the shoulders of the highway with only their heads
and perhaps their front feet extending over the paved road, there is
some doubt as to whether the vehicle can properly be said to be on the
highway and thus within the requirements of Section 12614-3.
Even if the decedent were negligent per se because of failing to com-
ply with the standard set by statute, there remains the question whether
such negligence contributed to the injury. Schweinfurth v. Cleveland
Ry. Co., 6o Ohio St. 215, 54 N.E. 89 (1899); Napier v. Patterson,
198 Iowa 257, 196 N.W. 73 (1923); Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y.
164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920). As Cardozo said in the last case, "We
must be on our guard, however, against confusing the question of negli-
gence with that of casual connection between the negligence and the
injury. A defendant who travels without lights is not to pay damages
for his fault unless the absence of lights is the cause of the disaster. A
plaintiff who travels without them is not to forfeit the right to damages
unless the absence of lights is at least a contributory cause of the dis-
aster. To say that conduct is negligence is not to say that it is always
contributory negligence."
So in the principal case the illumination of the highway by the lights
from the cider mill might easily have made decendent's vehicle just as
visible as though the lights required by the statute were present on the
vehicle. If so, the absence of lights on the vehicle while constituting
negligence would not be a proximate cause of injury, and would not bar
the plaintiff from recovery.
It seems well settled that the absence of lights, in violation of statute
or ordinance, must be found to be a proximate cause of the accident
if it is to affect the result. Yahnke v. Lange, 168 Wis. 512, 17o N.W.
722 (1919); Hanser v. Youngs, 212 Mich. 5o8, 18o N.W. 409
(1920); Kinsey v. Brugh, 161 S.E. 41, (Va., 1931); Peper v.
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Walsworth, 6 La. App. 61o (1928); Sexton v. Stiles, 130 So. 821
(La. App., 1930).
Under the circumstances of the principal case the court could not
well have taken the question of proximate cause from the jury.
JUSTIN H. FOLKERTH
TRUSTS
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES- EXECUTOR AS TRUSTEE TO
MAINTAIN GRAVES - GIFT FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSE
The testator by his will directed "that my executors ... hold in trust
the sum of $15oo and with the income thereof provide for the decora-
tion of the graves of my parents... and also my own grave ... execu-
tors to have the right at any time they desire to no longer act as trustees
. . . to make arrangements with the Spring Grove Cemetery Associa-
tion to continue the decoration of the above enumerated graves . . ."
The question presented was whether this case was a chancery case and
was appealable. This depended upon whether the will created a trust.
The Court of Appeals, First District, held that there was no trust, in
view of the fact that no cestui is named, but rather an intent on the
part of the testator to create a power attached to the executorship. Whit-
ing v. Bertram, 51 Ohio App. 40, 3 Ohio Op. 292, 199 N.E. 367,
19 Ohio Abs. 363 (1935).
It is an established principle of trust law that no trust can exist
without a cestui. "A trust without a cestui is like an agent without a
principal or a husband without a wife." Smith, "Honorary Trusts and
the Rule Against Perpetuities," 30 Col. L. Rev. 6o (930). Some
courts have held that the cestui must be a living person, one who can
enforce the trust. Festorazzi v. St. Joseph's Church, 104 Ala. 327,
25 L.R.A. 360 (1893). Where there is no such living cestui, "it
would seem that they (the trusts) could be attacked on this ground in
all cases." I Bogert, on Trusts, page 484. But see, Gray, "Rule
Against Perpetuities" 3rd Ed. sec. 828.
A study of the cases, however, reveals two exceptions to this rule.
The first is the classification of trusts known as honorary or imperfect
trusts. This group involves trusts for the erection of monuments,
tombs, mausoleums, and upkeep of graves for a limited time. The cases
warrant the following general conclusions:
(a) Both the English and American courts have held overwhelm-
ingly that a bequest for the erection of a monument, tomb, or gravestone
